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Peter Bofinger and Eric Mayer, Würzburg 2006 
 
Summary  
This note shows that the Svensson versus McCallum and Nelson controversy battled in the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Loius Review (September/ October 2005) can be mapped into a 
static version of a New Keynesian macro model that consists of an IS-equation, a Phillips 
curve and an inflation targeting central bank (e.g., Bofinger, Mayer, Wollmershäuser, (2006); 
Walsh (2002)). As a contribution to literature we supplement the controversy by a forceful 
graphical analysis. The general debate centers  on the question by which notion monetary 
policy should be  implemented. The two sides have  fundamentally opposite views on this 
issue. Svensson argues for targeting rules as a notion of optimal monetary policy, whereas 
McCallum and Nelson  promote simple instrument rules. In this note we systematically 
analyze these two categories of monetary policy rules. In particular we show that the rule 
discussed by McCallum and Nelson (2005) imposes different degrees of variability on the 
economy compared to a targeting rule when monetary policy falls prey to measurement error. 
To our opinion the hybrid Taylor rule developed   by McCallum and Nelson contradicts the 
original idea of simple rules as a heuristic for monetary policy making and should be rebutted 
for practical reasons. 
 
Introduction 
In this note we  review the controversy between Svensson versus McCallum and Nelson 
battled in the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review (September/ October 2005) in a 
static version of a New Keynesian model (Bofinger, Mayer, Wollmershäuser (2006), Walsh 
(2002)). Reduced to its fundamentals we analyze the controversy by showing the advantages 
and disadvantag es of simple instrument rules versus a regime of optimal monetary policy.  
Additionally we highlight the question whether supposedly optimal rules are more likely in 
fact to be closer to optimal than well  –designed simple instrument rules in the face of  
__________________ 
# The authors would like to thank Bennett McCallum and Lars Svensson for extremely helpful and  valuable 
comments.    2 
measurement error. As a contribution to literature  we  supplement the controversy by a 
forceful graphical analysis. The debate centers on the question by which strategy monetary 
policy should be implemented. Svensson ((2005), (2003)) strongly promotes so-called 
targeting rules. Generally speaking targeting rules can be considered as a policy regime that 
implements a linear combination of target variables. Often  they are consolidated first-order 
conditions of the central bank’s optimization problem. Simple rules can never be as good as 
optimal monetary policy regimes that use all relevant information. Nevertheless simple rules 
hav e the advantage of being robust to model uncertainty as they are not-fine tuned towards a 
specific model (McCallum (1988)). Therefore, in the light of uncertainty on the true structure 
of the economy there is a case for simple rules (Levine, Williams (2003)). 
In this note we will compare simple versus  targeting rules to clarify the controversy. An 
important contribution of our note is the explicit comparison of Taylor-like instrument rules 
as proposed by McCallum and Nelson and optimal monetary policy regimes as proposed by 
Svensson in a static model. We argue that the rule proposed by McCallum and Nelson should 
be rebutted for practical reasons. 
 
Targeting rules versus Taylor rules in a simple framework 
Let us assume that the economy is characterized by the following static version of a New 
Keynesian macro model (Bofinger, Mayer, Wollmershäuser (2006), Walsh (2002)): 
 
(1)          1 yabr e =-+ 
 
(2)          02 dy ppe =++ . 
 
Thus the demand side of the economy is governed by an IS-equation (1), where (a) denotes a 
positive constant and (r) is the real interest rate. The white noise term e1 is composed of 
shocks hitting the demand side (e.g., fiscal spending shocks, preference shocks). The supply 
side of the economy is given by a New Keynesian Phillips curve, where  p0 denotes the 
inflation target of the central bank and (y) measures the output gap. The white noise shock e2 
measures all cost push shocks hitting the economy (e.g., shocks to wages). This reduced -form 
model is well established in literature and applied in a dynamic version by Svensson (2005) as 
well as by McCallum and Nelson ((2005), (2003)). The controversy centeres around the issue 
by which monetary policy rule the model should be closed. Svensson  insists that monetary   3 
policy in many inflation targeting countries can be described as if implementing targeting 
rules (Svensson (2005), p. 615):  
 
“[…] the fact is that central banks normally do not use the fallback options of simple 
instrument rules of Taylor and McCallum, […]. Advanced central banks attempt to do better, 
to fullfill their objectives as well as possible, to optimize. I am advocating targeting rules as a 
better way to describe and prescribe this kind of  monetary policy than the simple instrument 
rules. ” 
 
This view is categorically rejected by McCallum and Nelson who instead claim that actual 
central bank behaviour o f inflation targeting countries is best described as if implementing 
simple instrument rules (McCallum, Nelson (2005), p.602): 
 
“Our second point concerns Svensson’s contention that actual central banks noted for their 
inflation-targeting regimes, including the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Bank of Canada, 
and the Bank of England, use in practice procedures that are more reasonably characterized 
by the notion of a targeting rule rather than an instrument rule. We have already mentioned 
that none of these central banks has publicly adopted an explicit objective function. But, 
furthermore, we find that descriptions of their policy procedures provided by officials and 
economists of these central banks read more like instrument rules than specific targeting 
rules.” 
 
Thus the general debate not only centres around the question by which notion monetary 
policy should be implemented, but there is  also  a  fundamental dissent by which notion 
monetary policy is actually implemented.  
 
Targeting rules 
If monetary policy is conducted according to the notion of a targeting rule as suggested by 
Svensson (2005), it will exploit its full knowledge on the transmission structure of the 
economy. Targeting rules which are directly derived from the central banks objective function 
are labeled  as so called ‘strict targeting rules’. Let us assume that monetary policy is guided 
the following loss function: 
 
(3)          ( )
2 2
0 Ly ppl =-+ .   4 
 
Accordingly the central bank aims at stabilizing squared deviations of the inflation rate from 
the inflation target p0 while equally having a concern for economic activity. If  0 l >  such 
preferences are defined as a policy of flexible inflation targeting; if  0 l =  we speak of strict 
inflation targeting or an inflation nutter (Svensson (1999)). The targeting rule can be derived 
by solving the following Lagrangian (Bofinger, Mayer, Wollmershäuser (2004)): 
 
(4)        ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
002 Hydy pplxppe =-++--- , 
 
where we have used that the IS-equation is a non-binding resource constraint from the 
perspective of the central bank. In other words, the use of the instrument (r) is not associated 
with any real costs (Walsh (2003), p.524). Taking the derivative with respect to the output gap 
(y) and the inflation rate p  we arrive at the following two first order conditions: 
 




x =  
 
(6)                   ( ) 0 2 xpp =--. 
 
Eliminating the Lagrange multiplier  x  and solving the resulting expression for the inflation 
gap (p-p0) retrieves the targeting rule (see Svensson (2005) p. 618; McCallum, Nelson (2005), 
p. 603): 
 
(7)          ( ) 0 y
d
l
pp -=- . 
 
Thus the targeting rule is directly derived from the central bank’s objective function subject to 
the Phillips curve. Therefore it can be interpreted as a high level specification of monetary 
policy, as it holds with equality if monetary policy is conducted optimally. Graphically the 
targeting rule (TR) can be depicted as a downward sloping curve in the ( p;y)- space (see 
Figure 1). If the central bank puts a higher weight on inflation (decreasing l) the slope of the 
targeting rule flattens, whereas in the opposite case it will increase. 












Figure 1: Targeting rule 
 
Svensson strongly argues in favor of targeting rules as they  can be interpreted as a step 
towards a more micro-founded perception of monetary policy. A development which, 
according to Svensson, has been taking place long ago in other branches of macroeconomic 
theory (Svensson (2005), p. 617): 
 
“The consumption function can be seen as an instrument rule for consumption behavior, 
whereas the Euler condition […] can be seen as a targeting rule for consumption. When I 
argue for the adoption of targeting rules rather than instrument rules in modeling monetary 
policy, I am arguing for a development in the theory of monetary policy that already 
happened, a long time ago, in the theory of consumption”. 
 
A micro -founded perception of targeting rules can also be given as follows. In equilibrium it 
will have to hold that the marginal rate of transformation (MRT) between the inflation gap (p-
p0) and the output gap (y) has to be equal to the marginal rate of substitution (MRS): 
 
(8)          MRTMRS = . 
 
The marginal rate of substitution is d etermined by the loss function (3) of the central bank, 
which trades off the goal variables by a factor of l. The marginal rate of transformation is 
embedded in the slope of the Phillips curve (d). According to equation (8) in equilibrium it 
will have to hold that: 
   6 












Therefore as noted by Svensson (2005) the t argeting rule might simply be interpreted as an 
efficiency condition between the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal rate of 
transformation. 
Equations (1), (2) and (7) give a complete description of the economy under a regime of 
targeting rules. To evaluate the concrete implications of targeting rules we solve the model in 
terms of endogenous variables (y), p and (r) as functions of the exogenous variables  1 e  and 
2 e : 
 























The reduced form system is de scribed by the following characteristics. The reaction of the 
central bank to cost push shocks depends on preferences l. A central bank that only cares 
about inflation (l = 0), requires a strong real rate response and, accordingly, a large output 
gap. With an increasing l the real interest rate response declines. In equilibrium  ( ) 12 0 e=e=  
the real interest rate will be given by the neutral real short-term interest rate  0 / rab = . Note 
that shocks hitting the demand side of the economy can be completely undone by adjusting 
the real interest rate by a factor of (1/b), which is not preference dependent. 
If the economy is confronted with a positive cost push shock (e2>0), Figure 2(a) shows that 
the Phillips curve is shifted upwards. If the central bank decides to remain passive , we can see 
that at a constant real interest rate the output gap remains zero. The inflation rate increases 
from p0 to pB (point B). It is important to note that this requires an equivalent increase in the 
nominal rate because inflation has gone up. Alternatively the central bank can increase the   7 
real interest rate in order to keep inflation at its target level. In this case, it has to accept a 
negative output gap  yA (point A). Of course, the central bank can also decide to target 
intermediate combinations of (y) and p that lie on the Phillips curve between points A and B. 
If it is guided by the specific targeting rule, it will opt for point C. By the very definition of a 
first-order condition this ensures that, for a given value of private sector expectations and thus 
any location of the Phillips curve, that the loss function (3) is minimized. Graphically, the 
optimal outcome is thus described by the intersection of the Phillips curve PC1 with the 
specific targeting rule of the central bank. In the case of a demand shock we can see from 
Figure 2(b) that monetary policy is always able to maintain the bliss combination by adjusting 
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(b) Demand Shock 
Figure 2: Monetary policy outcomes under a specific targeting rule 
 
McCallum and Nelson’s hybrid Taylor rule 
As noted, McCallum and Nelson ((2003), (2005)) have a different perception o f the actual 
conduct of monetary policy. As a reference point they propose the following hybrid rule: 
 
(13)        ( ) 00 rry
d
l
mpp ￿￿ =+-+ ￿￿
Łł
. 
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This rule is a hybrid rule as it combines elements of classical Taylor rules with elements of 
specific targeting rules typically assigned to optimal monetary policy. It resembles a Taylor 
rule as monetary policy reacts to deviations of the inflation rate from the inflation target (p-
p0) and the output gap (y). It reminds us of a specific targeting rule as the deviation of the 
inflation target from the inflation rate versus the output gap is scaled by the optimal trade-off 
ratio ( l/d). The intuition behind this rule is simple. If the central bank is off its reaction 
function  ( ) ( ) 0 0 dy ppl -+„  it should react with its instrument (r). If 
( ) ( ) 0 0 dy ppl -+>  real interest rates need to b e lowered as e.g., the inflation gap is 
smaller than the scaled output gap whereas in the opposite case interest rates are too lose 
given the state of the cycle. 
 
McCallum and Nelson’s rule as a simple instrument rules 
Let us first compare the hybrid Taylor with a targeting rule for small values of  m. For small 
values of  m equation ( 13) becomes a simple instrument rule like the original Taylor rule 
(1993). At the heart of simple rules lies the notion that they are not derived from an objective 
function.  More fundamentally they are not even based on a  particular model.  Instead the 
coefficients are chosen ad -hoc, based on the experiences and skills of the monetary 
policymakers. The most prominent version of a simple rule is the original Taylor rule (1993). 
According to this rule the actual real interest rate is defined as the sum of the equilibrium real 
interest rate (r0) adjusted for the deviation of the inflation rate from the inflation target and the 
output gap. The relative weight attached to the gaps is determined by the coefficients (e) and 
(f): 
 
(14)        ( ) 00        e,f>0 rrefy pp =+-+ . 
 
If we assume for the sake of exposition that (l/d) is approximately one and set m equal to 0.5 
the original Taylor rule (14) is just a special case of equation (13), where e=m and f=m(l/d). 
Hence if monetary policy sets  m sufficiently low we can evaluate the monetary policy 
outcomes of rule (13) by analyzing the Taylor rule (14). Under a regime of Taylor rules the 
economy is described by the equations (1), (2) and (14). The solution of the model in terms of 
endogenous variables (y), p and (r) as a function of exogenous variables  1 e  and  2 e  is given as 
follows: 
   9 





























Equations (15) and (16) show immediately that a simple rule is suboptimal compared to a 
targeting rule  as demand shocks have an impact  on the inflation rate and the output gap. 
Graphically the Taylor-rule translates into a downward sloping aggregate demand curve in the 
(p;y) space. 
 










































































(b) Cost Push Shock 
Figure 3: Monetary policy outcomes under a classical Taylor rule 
 
If the economy is hit by a negative demand shock the IS-curve in the upper panel of Figure 
3(a) shifts leftwards. In response to the decrease of the output gap from 0 to y´ the central 
bank lowers real interest rates – by moving along the MP( p0)-line – from r0 to r´, which leads 
to the output gap y´. In the lower panel the aggregate demand curve has to shift. Its new locus   10 
is obtained by the fact that it has to go through a point, which is defined by the new output 
gap (y´) and the (so far) unchanged inflation rate p0. The new equilibrium is reached by the 
intersection of the shifted aggregate demand curve with the unchanged Phillips-curve. It is 
characterized by an output decline to y1 (which is less than  y´) and an inflation rate p1. The 
decline of the output gap from y´ to y1 and the inflation rate to p1 (instead of p´) is due to fact 
that the central bank additionally reduces the real interest rate, because the Taylor rule 
requires a lower real rate because of the decline in the inflation rate. In the upper panel this is 
reflected by a downward shift of the MP line, which intersects with the IS1 line at the same 
output level, which results from the intersection of the AD1 line with the Phillips curve in the 
lower panel. For a graphical discussion of a cost push shock we see that in the y-p space (see 
Figure 3(b)), the Phillips curve is shifted upwards which increases the inflation rate to p´. In 
this case the Taylor rule requires a higher real interest rate which leads to a negative output 
gap y1. The reduced economic activity finally dampens the increase of the inflation rate to p1.  
 
Comparing simple versus specific targeting rule 
Let us now compare a targeting rule as proposed by Svensson with the rule proposed by 
McCallum and Nelson  for small values of m. A simple rule like the Taylor rule which only 
reacts mechanically to inflation (p) and output (y) can generally not be as good as a rule that 
uses all relevant information on the concrete values of macroeconomic shocks  1 e  and  2 e . 
Within this simple framework we can identify the mechanisms that prevent simple rules from 
being as good as optimal rules. By comparing the coefficients in the reduced form instrument 
rules we see for the case of a demand shock that optimal and simple monetary policy rules can 
only be identical if the reaction coefficient in front of  1 e  in equation (12) and (17) are the 
same. Thus equating coefficients the following equation would have to hold: 
 








Equation (19) however can only be true if either (e) or (f) go to infinity. Obviously for a 
parameterization as originally proposed by Taylor (e=f=0.5) this can never be the case. For a 
cost push shock both types of rules may lead to identical outcomes. Equating the reaction 
coefficients leads to:  
   11 






Thus in the case of a cost push shock both types of rules may potentially yield identical 
results. In sum, considering the full universe of possible shocks simple rules are suboptimal 
compared to targeting rules. This might pose the question why to use simple rules at all! 
Following McCallum (1988) there is a strong argument for simple instrument rules in an 
uncertain environment. Empirical eviden ce seems to suggest that in an environment of model 
uncertainty simple rules perform on average better than a targeting rule taken from one model 
to another model (Levine and Williams, (2003)). McCallum and Nelson state ( McCallum, 
Nelson (2005), p.599) 
 
“Consequently, an attractive approach to policy design, promoted, for example, by McCallum 
(1988, 1999), is to search for an instrument rule that performs at least moderately well-
avoiding disasters- in a variety of plausible models.” 
 
McCallum and Nelson’s rule as an optimal instrument rule 
The hybrid Taylor rule (13) as proposed by McCallum and Nelson can potentially  lead to 
identical monetary policy outcomes as a regime of optimal monetary policy. A possible 
equivalence of a targeting rule as proposed by Svensson and the hybrid rule can be shown 
analytically by solving the IS-equation and the Phillips-curve in conjunction with the hybrid 
Taylor  rule. Equations (1), (2) and (13) give a complete description of the economy. The 
implied reduced forms are given by: 
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As claimed by McCallum and Nelson (2005) by comparing (21), (22) and (23) to (10), (11), 
and (12) it prevails that the ‘Svensson economy’ and the ‘McCallum and Nelson economy’ 
produce identical results in means and variances if we let  m  go to infinity. Although this 
might be analytically straightforward a much  clearer cut intuition is given by the graphical 
exposition.  Algebraically, the AD-curve can be derived by inserting the hybrid Taylor rule 
(13) into the IS -curve (1):  
 










As one can see quite easily for the case of m approaching infinity, the slope of the aggregate 
demand function converges towards (l/d) which is identical to the slope of the targeting rule. 
Additionally from equation (13) we know that the slope of the hybrid Taylor-rule in the (r;y)-
space becomes vertical if  m  goes to infinity. Thus for this case the graphical analysis is 
identical to the case of optimal monetary policy. If the economy is hit by a negative demand 
shock (e1<0) (see Figure 4 (a)) the IS-curve is shifted to the left so that at a constant real 






























































(b) Cost Push Shock 
Figure 4: Monetary policy outcomes under the hybrid Taylor rule 
 
In the lower panel this translates into an inflation rate p1 that would be below the central 
banks inflation target p0. If monetary policy is conducted according to the hybrid Taylor-rule   13 
(HR) as proposed by McCallum and Nelson (2005) the real interest rate will be lowered from 
(r0) to (r1) so that the output gap is closed and inflation is at its target level. Therefore demand 
shocks do not impose any costs on society if  m  goes to infinity.  If the economy is confronted 
with a cost push shock ( e2>0), the lower panel 4(b) shows that the Phillips curve will be 
shifted upward. If the central bank is guided by McCallum and Nelson’s (2005) hybrid Taylor 
rule (HR) it trades-off the inflation loss versus the output loss by a ratio of (l/d). Graphically 
the optimal outcome is thus described by the intersection of the Phillips curve with the hybrid 
Taylor rule of the central bank.  
Thus the analysis shows that the hybrid Taylor rule can change its nature depending on the 
size of m. This can equally be shown with the help of efficiency frontiers. Under a specific 
targeting rule as proposed by Svensson (2005) the variance of the output gap (y) and the 
inflation gap (p-p0) are given as follows:  
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In the case of the hybrid Taylor rule as proposed by McCallum and Nelson (2005) the 
variances are defined by the following expressions: 
 
(27)    ( ) ( )
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If we vary l with step size 0.01, we can compute a stylized efficiency frontier for the case of 
an optimal monetary policy regime as suggested by Svensson (see Figure 5). The efficiency 
frontier divides the Var(y) and Var(p-p0) plane in two regions. All points that lie below the 
line are not feasible. All points that lie above the frontier are feasible but not efficient. The 
line itself represents all feasible and efficient combinations of variances of the inflation gap   14 
and the output gap. The convex shape of the efficiency frontier reflects the trade-off induced 
by cost push shocks. A lower variance of the inflation gap (output gap) can only be realized at 
the cost of an increasing variance of the output gap (inflation gap). For increasing values of m 
the feasible frontier generated by the hybrid Taylor rule converges towards the efficiency 
frontier generated by the targeting rule. For small values of m the hybrid Taylor-rule shares 
important characteristics of simple rules, in particular that it is suboptimal, whereas for large 
values of m it produces observationally equivalent outcomes as a targeting rule. 




















Figure 5: Efficiency Frontiers 
 
Therefore given the standard model described by the equations (1) and (2) in conjunction with 
a hybrid Taylor rule or a targeting rule McCallum, Nelson ((2005), p.606) are correct to state: 
 
“Thus, there appears to be little to choose from between targeting rules and instrument rules 
[…]”. 
 
Targeting rules or hybrid Taylor rules? The case of measurement error   
In a given New Keynesian model, where the interest rate impacts on inflation and output in 
the same period the two rules produce identical results in the limit if  m goes to infinity.  
Demand shocks do not impose any costs on society, whereas in the case of cost push shocks 
the central bank chooses its preferred stabilization mix, depending on its preferences l and the 
slope of the Phillips curve (d). Thus, the standard model is inappropriate to discriminate 
between targeting rules and a hybrid Taylor for large values of m. For small values of m  the 
question whether to implement simple or optimal policy largely depends on its knowledge of   15 
the true structure of the economy. In an uncertain environment it seems reasonable to fall 
back on simple rules whereas in the case of full knowledge on the transmission structure 
targeting rules are superior. As a hybrid Taylor rule and a targeting rule produce identical 
outcomes one may ask: What is the fuzz all about? An additional  argument of Svensson to 
discredit the rule discussed by McCallum and Nelson (2005) is to introduce measurement 
error. Let us assume that the central bank falls prey to measurement error and bases its interest 
rate decision upon a flawed information set. This means in particular that the central bank can 
only imperfectly observe private plans on consumption and pricing decisions. Accordingly an 
observational error  3 e  influences the  interest rate setting behaviour of the central bank. 
Additionally let us assume that the inflation rate , the output gap, and the interest rate are all 
simultaneously determined. Accordingly the measurement error  3 e  becomes an exogenous 
variable. To compute the impact of measurement error one has to modify the rules as follows: 
 
(29)        ( ) 03 0 y
d
l
ppe -++=  
 
(30)        ( ) 003 rry
d
l




As beforehand the ‘Svensson economy’  and  the  ‘McCallum and Nelson economy’ are 
identical in outcomes for large values of m . 
Extended for measurement errors the aggregate demand curves can be written as follows: 
 












(32)        03 y
d
l
ppe =--  
 
As (bm) is strictly positive the hybrid Taylor rule (31) will always be steeper in the (y, p)-
space than the targeting rule (32). The relevance of measurement error for the comparative 
advantages of targeting rules versus hybrid Taylor rules prevails quite clearly in the graphical 
analysis (see Figure 6). Starting from the initial equilibrium ( p0;0) measurement error e3 
moves the hybrid Taylor rule and the targeting rule by an identical shift. As the slope of the   16 
hybrid Taylor rule is always steeper than the slope of the targeting rule  the inflation and 




































Figure 6: Measurement error 
 
This analysis shows that measurement error is no intrinsic argument for targeting rules. On 
the contrary the damage imposed by measurement error is larger under a targeting rule than 
under a  hybrid Taylor rule. Depending on the absolute size of the measurement error this 
might even imply that the overall loss ranking between targeting rules and hybrid Taylor rules 
can be reversed .  
 
Measurement error and predetermined private plans 
If we modify the timing patterns  of the economy, hybrid Taylor rules display central flaws. 
Let us assume that the private sector settles its labor and good markets contracts conditioned 
on the expected real interest rates r
e. So we have to modify the IS-equation as follows: 
 
(33)          1
e yabr e =-+ . 
 
Then in the rational expectations equilibrium the private sector expects the measurement error 
of the central bank to equal zero. So the private sector expects a relation between the expected 
interest rate r
e, and its plans (and actual inflation and output gap), p and (y), given by 
 




mpp Øø =+-+ Œœ ºß
, 
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and chooses plans that fulfill (33) and (2). For given actual inflation and output gap equal to 
plans, the central bank then ex -post chooses the interest rate according to (30), in which case 
there is a large interest rate volatility for m, since the actual output and inflation then are given 
and don’t instantaneously respond to the interest rate. The solved model of endogenous 
variables in terms of exogenous variables for inflation and output is given as follows: 
 






















By assumption the measurement error does not influence the output or inflation gap. 
Nevertheless as the central bank  is subject to measurement error the economy suffers under 






























Figure 7: Measurement error and predetermined  plans. 
 
Figure 7 shows in the upper panel that the hybrid Taylor rule (HR)  randomly drifts in the 
(y;r)-space, where the drawn bounds rmin and rmax might for the sake of graphical exposition 
be interpreted as the two standard deviation interval s given a normal distribution of e3. This 
leads Svensson to the conclusion (Svensson (2005), p. 621):   18 
 
“Central bankers, beware of McCallum and Nelson’s instrument rule!” 
 
Assuming more realistically that the economy is populated by firms that d epend on financial 
intermediation the impact of instrument volatility might be detrimental  for the financial 
industry if  banks face costs in the adjustment  of their  loan portfolios  (Hülsewig, Mayer, 
Wollmershäuser (2006)). Additionally a hybrid Taylor rule becomes completely impracticable 
for large values of m  if there are lag s  between  a shock and the interest rate reaction of the 
central bank. Figure 8 indicates to a certain extend, based on the actual data which interest 
rate the hybrid Taylor rule might have recommended. 
 























Short term interest rate
 























Short term interest rate
 
    (a) ECB            (b) FED 
Data: ECB’s AWM database, Economic data -fred; Calibration, m=50, (l/d)=1. 
 
Figure 8: A hybrid Taylor rule for large values of m. 
 
Quite arguably the hybrid Taylor rule was not coined towards such an  environment and 
economic agents are not accustomed to the rule , but the argument underlines that for large 
values of m the rule looses its character as a simple robust rule. To the defense of McCallum 
and Nelson they claim (McCallum and Nelson (2005), p. 630): 
 
“[…] the rule [] -with a very large value of m1 – is one that we say (explicitly) that we have 
not recommended []. It was used in our 2004 paper as an implementation device; in our 
current paper, it serves to illustrate our analytical claim, namely, that our instrument rule 
(actually, class of rules) is usually superior in performance, with respect to Lars’s own 
criterion, to the targeting rule that it approximates.” 
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Concluding remarks 
In this note we have reviewed the current controversy  between Svensson versus McCallum 
and Nelson battled in the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review (September/ October 
2005). We have shown that the debate can be mapped into a static version of a New 
Keynesian macro model (Bofinger, Mayer, Wollmershäuser (2006), Walsh (2002)).  As a 
contribution to literature we have supplemented the controversy by a forceful graphical 
analysis. Reduced to its fundamentals we have analyzed the controversy by showing the 
advantages and disadvantages of simple instrument rules versus a regime of optimal monetary 
policy. Additionally we highlight the question whether supposedly optimal rules are more 
likely in fact to be closer to optimal than well –designed simple instrument rules in the face of 
measurement error. Simple rules can never be as good as optimal monetary policy regimes 
that use all relevant information. More concretely we have analyzed the hybrid Taylor rule as 
discussed by McCallum and Nelson. Analytically there is little too choose between a targeting 
rule as proposed by Svensson and a hybrid Taylor rule as suggested by McCallum and Nelson 
for large  values of m. We can only discriminate between these two types of rules if we 
introduce measurement error. In the light of measurement error the arguments for one or the 
other rule are mixed. Under realistic assumptions on the frequency of private plans and the 
frequency by which the central bank might change its instrument the rule d eveloped by 
McCallum and Nelson  is likely to introduce a high degree of real interest rate volatility. 
Additionally the implementation of hybrid rules for large values of m contradicts the original 
idea of simple rules. Simple rules where thought of as a heuristic that equipps policymakers 
with a robust device to set interest rates reasonably well in an environment when monetary 
policy is subject to uncertainty concerning the true structure of the economy. Therefore we 
conclude that McCallum and Nelson’s rule becomes completely impracticable in a richer 
model that incorporates observation and transmission lags. In such a context the implied real 
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